A 'system of systems' (SoS) comprises many other systems operating collectively with a shared purpose. Individual system autonomy can give rise to unpredictable, and potentially undesirable, emergent behaviour. A policy is a set of rules that bounds the behaviours of entities. Policy can be expressed at various levels of abstraction. By building on existing goal-based decomposition approaches this paper proposes policy as a means of achieving safety in SoS. The decomposition of policy to lower levels of abstraction must be carried out in a consistent, complete and systematic manner. The approach is agent-oriented and emphasises the recognition of contextual assumptions (such as knowledge of other agents' behaviour) in decomposing policy. To this end we present patterns of decomposition based on KAOS tactics of refinement. The application of these patterns, expressed in the Goal Structuring Notation, is illustrated using existing civil aerospace policy (the Rules of the Air Regulations).
Introduction
There exist systems whose constituent components are sufficiently complex and autonomous to be considered as systems in their own right and which operate collectively with a shared purpose. Many real systems of systems are geographically distributed and some of its component systems are mobile. Examples are numerous and include any permanent transport network (such as air, rail or road) as well as more short-lived SoS which may arise in network-centric warfare.
In such SoS the interactions between component systems are not constrained by physical design as in conventional monolithic systems. Since the SoS often comprise systems designed, manufactured and operated by various organisations, the set of possible interactions between any of the entities in the whole SoS cannot be known by any one individual. Such unpredictable interactions, if left unchecked, can lead to undesirable emergent behaviour, which may lead to accidents and loss of life. Some means is required to bound the behaviour of the system entities in such a way that no accidents occur. Defining a safety policy is the first step towards providing the necessary degree of control of interactions and coordination of responsibility.
Historically, interpretation of policy has relied upon human intelligence; hence loose and possibly ambiguous guidelines have been acceptable. This has not always been successful, as evidenced by the case in which two aircraft ostensibly operating according to policy were nevertheless involved in a fatal collision [1] . In this case it seems that the policy was not constrictive enough. In contrast, work-to-rule strikes expose flaws in overly conservative policies by reducing operational effectiveness.
An increasing desire to deploy unmanned and highly autonomous systems has brought to the fore the challenge of producing correct and complete safety policies. With systems such as unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) entering service we no longer have the luxury of relying on human flexibility and ingenuity to deal with vague or over-constraining policies. A way must be found to decompose high-level safety goals into policy 'statements' that are formulated in such a way that they can be implemented by man or machine.
This paper puts forward a number of patterns for decomposition. Section 2 provides an overview of policy. Section 3 presents the challenges of developing policy. Sections 4 and 5 describe the approach to supporting policy development. Section 6 outline the problems of defining a resilient policy. Finally there is some discussion of related and future work.
Overview of Policy
Policy describes the allowed envelope of an entity's actions, in that it defines behaviour that is both permitted and required from individual entities in order to be able to operate in a given environment (as described by the assumed context). To take a simple example as an illustration, consider a mother who asks her child to go to the corner shop to buy a pint of milk. She may lay down two rules with which the child must comply on this trip:
1. The child must not talk to strangers. 2. The child must use the pedestrian crossing when crossing the road.
The first of these rules defines what the child is allowed to do, specifically it proscribes conversation with people with whom the child is not previously acquainted. The second statement expresses the obligation that the child should take a safe route across the road, namely by using the pedestrian crossing.
Together these rules form a policy that guides the behaviour of the child on a journey to the corner shop. However the policy is orthogonal to the plan or mission of the child. It still holds regardless of whether the child is going to buy a loaf of bread or a dozen eggs, or not going to the corner shop at all.
Both rules are motivated by the desire that no harm should come to the child. Perhaps we have identified being in the path of an oncoming car and being in the company of untrustworthy (and hence potentially malevolent) individuals as hazards. However, even this simple policy is fraught with problems. Indeed, it demonstrates problems that face larger and technologically more complicated SoS. That is, the need to constrain and permit interactions.
Challenges of Developing Safety Policy for SoS
There are a number of challenges to developing a safety policy for a system of systems. The policy must take into account the following SoS characteristics:
-Wide variety of systems.
-Dynamic environment.
-Changing number of system entities.
The inability to address these issues fully leads to an assumed or implicit context in expressed policy statements. Indeed, the challenges for developing policy for SoS are in addition to the issues of formulating policy in a more general sense:
-Ambiguous nature of policy statements.
-No structured process of generating policy.
-Statements expressed at various levels of abstraction with no clear relationship between them.
All policy statements are expressed in the context of assumptions about the capabilities of the systems they address. Therefore a policy places a restriction on the type of systems that may form part of the SoS. For instance, the policy above requires that the child be able to recognise and operate (where necessary) a pedestrian crossing. For legacy systems this requirement may entail modifying the way they operate to comply with policy, together with the attendant costs this involves. In the case of human operated systems, it may involve retraining people to be aware of the new policy. If, however, a capability is required that is not already provided by an existing system, or new technology (e.g. UAVs) is replacing old, the policy indirectly places constraints on the design of these new systems.
Clearly, therefore, there is a relationship between safety policy and the requirements on individual system design as well as the configuration of the SoS. This relationship is not at first obvious and, what is more, the concepts are often conflated in current policy documents. Similarly, the formulation and adherence to safety policy can have a strong relationship with the safety arguments required within system safety cases. The details of this relationship is beyond the scope of this paper but is discussed further in [2] .
Supporting Policy Development
The Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) [3] -typically used to construct safety cases -can be used to represent policy decomposition structures. In certain respects GSN is similar to another graphical notation, KAOS.
KAOS is a goal-oriented notation for representing requirements refinement hierarchies. However, KAOS adopts a more formal approach to the specification of goals in that it employs temporal logic to formulate expressions about requirements. Nevertheless, it is possible to adapt some of the methods from one technique to the other. Namely the work by Darimont and van Lamsweerde [4] detailing patterns of refinement.
Refinements in KAOS can be formally proven, whereas GSN (owing to the inductive nature of most safety arguments) does not attempt to formally prove decompositions. However, it has been suggested that argumentation techniques have a role to play in the engineering of emergent systems such as SoS [5] . Indeed, classical refinement is still a process of trial and error (ibid.). Using GSN allows documenting of the context under which the decomposition of the policy goals takes place. This means that any assumptions can be contested and that the decision processes are not hidden or implicit. They are therefore accountable and subject to scrutiny and change should they be found inadequate, or in the event of a change to the originally assumed context.
Policy cannot be formulated without consideration of the systems whose behaviour it is expected to influence. That is, there must exist a model of expectations about the agents and their environment. It is important to recognise and capture these expectations in terms of the context in which policy is expressed.
The policy model that is assumed in this work allows for a hierarchical structure of policy. The decomposition progresses from high-level, often state-based, goals down to action-oriented policy statements. GSN allows context to be captured at every level of the decomposition. It also explicitly documents the strategy by which the decomposition takes place. It is features such as these that KAOS lacks, and which we will make use of in the next section.
Patterns of Decomposition
In this section patterns are introduced that facilitate the process of decomposing policy from high-level safety goals down to implementable rules. These patterns are illustrated in GSN, however they have been inspired by work on tactics for requirements elaboration in KAOS. The reuse of common structures in GSN through the use of patterns has been recognised [6] . However, KAOS' patterns take advantage of the formal specification of requirements goals and can be formally derived and proven. Every pattern is proven once for all, hence every application of said pattern is correct.
Three tactics for developing patterns are identified by Darimont [7] :
The patterns are described in more detail in the following sections and illustrated with examples from the civil aerospace Rules of the Air Regulations (RoA). The RoA [8] can be thought of as the policy that guides the behaviour of aircraft that wish to operate in the civil aerospace system of systems. It is expressed as a natural language document, which sets out a number of rules for the safe inter-operation of aircraft and air traffic control (ATC).
The RoA document sets out rules without the principles on which they were derived. The work shown in this paper represents an attempt to reverse engineer the RoA and, in so doing, rediscover the rationale behind the rules. It is assumed that all the rules in the RoA are motivated by the top-level safety goal that no collisions shall occur in the civil aerospace SoS. Figure 1 shows the first few stages of policy decomposition. All further examples refer to steps of the decomposition below these policy goals 1 .
No collisions
No collisions shall occur in the civil aviation SoS
Collision strategy
Decomposition over all entities with which an aircraft can collide
Aircraft collision
An aircraft shall not collide with other aircraft
Ground collision
An aircraft shall not collide with the ground or fixed objects
Awareness
The pilot of an aircraft shall maintain his own awareness of other aircraft as well as contribute to others' awareness of his own
Control
The pilot of an aircraft shall control his aircraft such that it can be manoeuvred appropriately to avoid collisions in a shared airspace
Entities
Entities that should be avoided are other aircraft, the ground and fixed objects
Collision factors
Decomposition over factors to be maintained by pilot to avoid collision with other aircraft 
Agent-Based Decomposition
An agent-based decomposition concentrates on decomposing policies according to specific agents or groups of agents.
Agent Capabilities. Often it is desirable for a set of heterogeneous agents to adhere to a common policy. Clearly the way in which the policy must be broken down is dependent on the capability of said agent. This pattern is a specialisation of the case-based pattern, specifically each case represents a group of agents with a particular capability (or lack thereof). Figure 2 demonstrates how a policy to fly at an altitude that minimises the chance of collision encounters can be decomposed over the ability of agents to determine their altitude. There must be one policy for those systems able to determine their own flight level accurately (i.e. those with instruments), and one for those that cannot. Similarly, the policy could be decomposed over the ability of the agent type to modify their altitude -for instance, a glider may not climb in the same way as powered craft. Different ways of complying with the same policy must be devised for both types of agent.
In fact figure 2 also demonstrates how this decomposition pattern can be extended beyond agent capabilities to encompass all agent properties. The second strategy in the decomposition splits the policy according to the existing altitude of the aircraft. In this way it approaches the more general case-based pattern discussed later.
Agent Cooperation. This is a specialisation of the milestones pattern. However, in contrast with that pattern the milestones are assigned to different agents.
Consider figure 7 . The policy that the conflict of right of way must be resolved when overtaking can be decomposed into the responsibilities of the two systems involved. One aircraft must cede to the other aircraft, which then has priority and is allowed to pass. These requirements on the agents are shown in figure 3 Overtaking Overtaking shall be handled appropriately
OvertakingKeepOutOfWay
The pilot of an aircraft shall alter his course to the right to keep out of the way of the aircraft being overtaken (17)(4)(a)
OvertakingRightOfWay
The pilot of an aircraft being overtaken shall have right of way (17)(4)(a)
Fig. 3. Decomposition over Cooperating Agents
as two separate subgoals. The two policies are dependent on one another in that they represent the cooperation of two agents.
Milestone-Based Decomposition
A milestone-based decomposition attempts to decompose a policy goal by identifying an intermediate state to be achieved that contributes to the satisfaction of the policy goal. This is illustrated in figure 4 . The milestone and the policy goal are temporally related; that is, the achievement of the milestone precedes the satisfaction of the final goal. The first subgoal states that the milestone be achieved, while the second subgoal defines a policy goal that can be achieved as a consequence of the milestone being achieved.
For example, a policy goal from the RoA identifies that to maintain good visibility pilots must not fly in poor weather conditions. This goal can be achieved by describing a milestone policy with two subgoals. The first subgoal requires the pilot first to become aware of the weather conditions through acquiring the latest weather forecast prior to take-off. A second subgoal requires that a pilot may not take-off if the forecast predicts bad weather (in the context of 'bad weather').
Variants of this particular example milestone occur frequently. An agent (human or machine) must first become aware of some state (be it troop movements or the state of the weather) whereupon some restriction on its actions is made
Weather
The pilot of an aircraft shall not fly in poor weather conditions (16)
PoorWeather
An aircraft is not permitted to take-off if the forecasted weather indicates that the destination aerodrome's conditions will have a visibility < 10km or cloud ceiling < 1500 feet on arrival.
ObtainForecast
The pilot of an aircraft must obtain the weather forecast for the proposed flight prior to takeoff 16(1)
KnowWeather

Decomposition by achievement of milestone 'know weather conditions'
PoorWeather
Poor weather is defined as being the presence of low visibility conditions or a low cloud ceiling PredictWeather A weather forecast contains sufficient information for a pilot to predict weather conditions PoorWeatherDefn Visibility of < 10km or a cloud ceiling < 1500 feet provides an unacceptably poor visual range for the pilot
Fig. 4. Decomposition over Achievement of Milestone
Weather2
The pilot of an aircraft shall not fly in poor weather conditions (16) 
Poor Weather
Obtain Forecast
Know Weather
Decomposition by achievement and maintenance of milestone 'know weather conditions'
NotTakeOffPoorWeather
An aircraft must not take off if the weather forecast for its destination predicts poor weather on arrival
RespondToWeather
An aircraft must respond to a change in the predicted weather
UpToDateForecast
The pilot of an aircraft must request an updated weather forecast every two hours
LandASAP
An aircraft must land at the nearest aerodrome as soon as possible if the forecasted weather indicates that the destination aerodrome's conditions will have a visibility < 10km or cloud ceiling < 1500 feet on arrival.
ChangingWeather
Weather forecast may change during flight to destination
Forecast
Two hours is sufficient to remain up to date with current forecasts accordingly. This can be demonstrated by a standardised model of agent behaviour -such as OODA [9] -in that the observations made directly or indirectly (e.g. through third party information) affect the agent's actions.
All decomposition patterns are advisory; they guide the thoughts of the policy maker rather than constrict them. The decomposition process is not automatic, it is a creative process and the choice of a different pattern can lead to a different, but nonetheless viable policy.
A subtle variation on the milestone policy demonstrates this. Consider, instead of simply reaching the milestone once (treating it as a target), that the milestone were maintained in some way. This pattern leads to a subtly different decomposition of policy and hence affects the way the system operates. In this example the pilot would have not only to obtain the weather forecast but also to keep up to date with any changes ( figure 5 ). This has non-trivial implications for the policy decomposition. It is too late to forbid take-off if the weather forecast predicts poor weather once the aircraft is in flight. The policy-maker then has a number of options for the pilot's behaviour: land at the next available opportunity, return to origin, or simply contact ATC and await instructions. 
VisRangeOutContrAirspace
The pilot of an aircraft shall maintain a minimum visual range from the cockpit outside controlled airspace (26)
ReportedVisibility
Visual range (visibility) is that communicated to the pilot by ATC upon landing or takingoff from an aerodrome (24)(3)
VisRangeClassAirspa ce
Decomposition over all classes of airspace
AirspaceClasses
Controlled airspace is either of class A, B, C, D or E
VisRangeInClassBAirspace
The pilot of an aircraft shall maintain a minimum visual range from the cockpit within class B airspace (25)(1)
VisRangeInClassCDEAirspace
The pilot of an aircraft shall maintain a minimum visual range from the cockpit within class C, D and E airspace (25)(2)
ClassA
Flights in class A airspace are assumed to require no minimum visibility
ATControl
Controlled airspace is controlled by an air traffic control unit
FlightLevel
Decomposition over flight level of aircraft
Below1000
Aircraft flying below 1000 feet must maintain a visibility > 5km
Above1000
Aircraft flying above 1000 feet must maintain a visibility > 8km
VisibilityAtAltitude
Altitude of aircraft affects visibility
Case-Based Decomposition
A case-based decomposition attempts to break the policy down into a number of cases, with each subgoal representing a case. Policy goals can be thought of as consisting of two parts: the conditions under which the policy must apply and the active part of the policy, i.e. the actions that are allowed or forbidden or states that are to be maintained etc. It would seem natural that a policy would 'always' apply, but this is deceptive. The conditions include not only temporal constraints but also the classes of systems the policy applies to as well as other restrictions. A policy goal with no conditions would be truly universal and apply always and to all things. The second part of the policy goal describes what the policy is to achieve. In decomposing policies both of these parts can be considered and broken down into simpler cases.
Decomposition into Condition Cases. The conditions in which a policy applies may be decomposed into specific cases of these conditions. These cases may overlap, i.e. the policies covering two or more cases can apply at the same time, or they may be totally disjoint. Figure 6 shows an example of breaking down the fulfilment of a policy goal into a number of cases which do not overlap. Maintaining a sufficient visual range in all airspace can be broken down into those regions of airspace within ATC control and those outside. These two cases are obviously disjoint since there is no region of airspace that is not either uncontrolled or controlled by ATC. By applying the pattern again the policy that applies in controlled airspace can then be decomposed according to regions of airspace denoted with particular classes. In this case it must be asserted that the regions do not overlap, i.e. that there is no region that has more than one class assigned to it.
RightOfWay
Conflicts of right of way between two aircraft shall be resolved
RightofWaySituations
Decomposition over all situations in which two or more aircraft need to determine right of way
OnGround
The pilot of an aircraft shall give way appropriately to other vehicles on the ground (37)
Converging
The pilot of an aircraft shall give way appropriately to converging aircraft (17)(2)
HeadOn
The pilot of an aircraft shall alter his course to the right when approaching another aircraft head-on and a collision is imminent (neither plane has right of way) (17)(3)
Overtaking
Overtaking shall be handled appropriately
Landing
The pilot of an aircraft that is landing or on final approach shall have right of way (17)(6)
RoWSituations
Situations identified that require deconfliction of aircraft priorities are complete and overlapping
Fig. 7. Decomposition into Overlapping Cases
It is important to identify the type of case-based decomposition pattern because it has implications for how the child policies are formulated. Figure 7 illustrates the more tricky situation of decomposing the policy that right of way conflicts be resolved. One way to address this is by identifying all the cases in which a conflict can arise and generate a policy for each. Unfortunately it is not feasible to guarantee that the situations are completely disjoint. Where overlap between the cases occurs this implies that a resolution policy must be described for the intersection.
Decomposition into Active Cases. In a manner similar to identifying subcases of the conditions under which a policy applies, the active part of the policy can also be decomposed into cases. The policies covering the individual cases may be linked or convergent, where convergent means that any one of the policies individually fulfils the top-level policy and linked implies that all cases of the policy interdependently fulfil it [10] . Convergence does not necessarily mean that some of the policies are optional or that there is a choice. It means simply that each branch of the policy hierarchy below a policy goal independently fulfils this goal. Figure 8 shows how the policy of maintaining a pilot's awareness can be broken down into two (linked) cases. On the one hand, the active case of observing allows a pilot to maintain awareness of the current local environment. Similarly the pilot must consider the case of passive observation, i.e. the fact that he is being observed by other pilots. Policies facilitating both seeing and being seen are required in order for awareness in general to be maintained.
To deviate from the RoA briefly, taking an example from road traffic; a driver must signal the intention to turn or otherwise manoeuvre in good time. The policy (highway code) stipulates two possible ways of doing this: Either with mechanical indicators or using arm signals. These two policies are convergent in the sense that either one can reasonably indicate a driver's intention to turn. However, it should be clear that the use of arm signals provides a lower level of assurance [10] that the intention will be registered by other road users.
Problems of Defining a Resilient Policy
The very nature of the systems for which policy is being defined undermines the resilience of that policy. Systems of systems have dynamic structures, are distributed and consist of heterogeneous autonomous entities. It is these characteristics which necessitate the use of policy in the first place. However, they each present unique challenges.
Continual evolution of a dynamic SoS implies that systems are retired, replaced and upgraded and that the SoS has no well-defined 'end state'. This has implications for the resilience of policy because new systems can introduce new capabilities that break the context in which the original policy decisions were made. Similarly, systems that provide capabilities that were previously relied upon by policy can be withdrawn. The temptation is to create a policy that is liberal enough to accommodate such changes, whereas what is required is a process of recognising and systematically dealing with change [11] .
The fact that systems are heterogeneous and that they change in this way means that any decomposition of policy that identifies a specific target system (e.g. a specific make and model of aircraft) will inevitably be wrong for future systems. To avoid such a 'brittle' policy implies that the lowest level of abstraction at which policy is expressed involves implementation by a target system.
Policy is therefore open to interpretation in the way it is implemented by autonomous systems. This can lead to various implementations and potential problems. Such misinterpretations must be, where possible, mitigated by an unambiguous policy. Unfortunately, unlike the KAOS patterns, safety policy is not afforded the luxury of an unambiguous refinement. It is clear that 'policy failure analysis' will need to be undertaken in order to predict the possible misinterpretations in implementing policy. Indeed the problem of preempting failures in decomposition has already been considered in [12] .
So far, the issue of acceptable risk has remained implicit in our discussion. It can be implied that adhering to a defined set of policy objectives leads to an acceptable level of risk, while not following the policy leads to an unacceptable level of risk. However, such thinking masks how adherence, or non-adherence, to individual policy objectives contributes specifically to overall system risk. Other issues, such as the level of trust an agent has in its peer agents, is also masked.
Finally, because the systems are distributed means that coordinating policy distribution and adherence is not a trivial problem. In fact, given these characteristics, it would seem that the only reasonable way to evaluate policy is through simulation of a SoS. That is, by using policy to modify the simulated behaviour on a per-agent basis.
Related Work
This work draws on two areas of research: policy specification and goal decomposition. The use of policies to curb the behaviour of system entities is well established in the security and management domains. There are many notations used to express policies for controlling organisational complexity. For example, Ponder [13] is a language that attempts to present a unified approach to policybased management and security. Ponder expresses policies in terms of authorisations and obligations in both positive and negative modalities. Whilst languages such as Ponder provide a means of expressing policy statements on agents, they do not deal well with the problems of expressing high-level policy objectives and their decomposition. Our work continues to look at how such policy languages can be integrated into policy decomposition.
There is also precedent in the area for the classification of policy into hierarchies of increasing abstraction [14, 15, 16] . It is suggested by Koch et al that a refinement of policy can be accomplished through the unambiguous mapping from one level of the hierarchy to the next. However, such an unambiguous mapping is not possible when considering safety policy goals for the reasons discussed in this paper. The approach presented in this paper is not strictly refinement (relying on deductive reasoning); instead it is a structured decomposition (relying on inductive reasoning). Other goal-directed decomposition approaches exist such as KAOS, TROPOS [17] and intent specifications [18] . However, none of these explicitly addresses the problems of systematising informal policy decomposition.
Further Work
The work presented in this paper provides a basis for resolving the problems of how to structure safety policy, however it is recognised that further work is necessary in a number of areas. Further evaluation of the use of patterns presented in this paper in defining new 'top-down' policy decompositions is required. Similarly, it is necessary to further define the context model of agents and its refinement, which is required to support the structuring and improved expression of policy goals. This improved expression of goals will aid in further work on detecting the potential for conflicts within and between policies in a multi-policy SoS. Finally, safety policy can be evaluated and improved by applying it to entities in a simulated SoS environment as discussed in a previous paper [19] .
Conclusions
This paper has shown how it is possible to begin to structure policy using a pattern-based decomposition approach. It is desirable to be able to produce a safety policy, to which a system of systems can operate. This approach stresses the importance of recognising the contextual assumptions and strategies of decomposition often implicit in real-world policy documents. The Goal Structuring Notation, which is typically used to structure safety cases, was used to organise Rules of the Air into a hierarchy of policy goals at different levels of abstraction.
A number of patterns of decomposition based upon the KAOS tactics of agent-, case-and milestone-based refinement have been presented. These patterns have been adapted from the formal specification of KAOS since policy goals are not represented formally.
It has also been shown that the intrinsic characteristics of SoS leads to challenges for developing safety policy. Given an ostensibly perfect set of policy rules, the dynamic and heterogeneous nature of SoS means that interpretation and implementation of the policy may lead to 'failure' of the policy.
It is clear that future work must also entail analysing how policy is affected by changing scenarios. Simulation provides the basis for experimental validation of policy.
